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SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LAWo
By

GRE

DOUTHWAITE*

Introduction
As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of
South Africa is autonomous. Her political tie with Great Britain rests solely
on free association. Though in the field of constitutional law the South
African picture presents features which, to one raised in the American
tradition, may well provoke the raised eyebrow, in other respects it presents a legal system with claim to unique merit. The purpose of this paper
is to present a bird's-eye view of both these aspects.
ConstitutionalLaw
Like England, South Africa has no constitution in the sense of a written
guarantee of those rights and liberties regarded here as fundamental. The
document from which the Union derives its existence as such is an enactment of the British Parliament, passed after full consultation with, and on
the recommendations of, a national convention of South Africans. The
South African legislature is, in this enactment, given full power to amend
any of its provisions; with the qualification, however, that the clauses
therein safeguarding the rights of certain classes of voters, and the clause
guaranteeing the continuance of the two official languages, English and
Afrikaans, are "entrenched." That is, they cannot be amended without a
two-thirds majority of both Houses-the House of Assembly and the
Senate-sitting together as a body.
Between the years 1951 and 1956 a grim struggle raged between the
South African legislature and the courts in regard to one of these entrenched clauses. In 1951 the Union Parliament passed an Act removing
non-whites from the common voters' roll and placing them on a separate
roll. In so doing it did not comply with the provision that requires a twothirds majority of both houses sitting together. On this ground, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held it void.
Nothing daunted, the legislature then passed, in the ordinary way of
legislation, another statute. This act created a "High Court of Parliament"
-consisting of parliamentarians themselves-endowed with jurisdiction
to pass on any decision of the Appellate Division pronouncing on the
validity of its enactments. This "court" duly set aside the decision holding
void its voter's roll enactment.
* BA. 1934, LL.B. 1936, Univ. of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, So. Africa; B.C.L. 1940,
Oxford, England. Admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of So. Africa, 1936. Practice in
Johannesburg, 1936-38. Assistant Professor of Law, Umv. of Santa Clara Law School, Santa

Clara, Calif.
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When, in due course, it fell to the Appellate Division to pronounce on
the validity of the statute creating this "High Court of Parliament," it
unanimously declared that act to be invalid. After several abortive rallies
in the form of attempts to amend the South Africa Act (the act containing
these entrenched clauses) by the required two-thirds unicameral majority,
the legislature decided on another course. It passed an act "packing" the
Senate.
With this reconstituted Senate, the legislature in 1956 was able to get
through, by a two-thirds majority of both houses sitting together, a much
broader measure than the original statute that had started the dispute. The
1956 act, in fiat terms, empowers Parliament to prescribe the qualifications
necessary to entitle persons to vote for members of the House of Assembly.
This act, though criticized as violating the spirit of the entrenchment provisions, in that it puts an end to the right of an individual to keep his name
on the voters' roll, has been upheld by the Appellate Division. Thus the
courts recognize that Parliament has the right, by ordinary legislation, to
prescribe the membership of the Senate and in this way provide itself with
an artificial majority.' No longer can it be said that the constitution is in
part rigid. This goes to add further strength to a fact already well recognized, namely, that in South Africa the legislature is sovereign.
Though the fundamental freedoms which are held dear here in this
country are, in large part, respected 2 they can be disregarded by the legislature, whose constitutional power to do so is unquestioned. South Africa
recognizes, for example, that it is against natural justice for a person to be
deprived of his rights without due notice and a hearing. When an authority
has power to give a decision which may affect the rights of, or involve consequences to, an individual, the person so to be affected ought to be
informed of the substance of prejudicial allegations against him.4 This
flows from the Roman doctrine of "audi alteram partem" (hear the other
side). But this doctrine has no application where it is clear that Parliament
has, expressly or by necessary implication, enacted that it should not apply. 5
Where the legislature, in the exercise of its supreme legislative power, sees
fit to deprive a person of the right of being heard in his own defense, or of
ICollins

v. Minister of Interior, [1957 (1)] So. Afr. L.R. 552 (A D.).

2 One aspect of "due process," for example, finds counterpart in the principle that, where

the statutory procedure prescribed for an administrative tribunal is not followed, and this
results in prejudice to one affected, the proceedings will be set aside by the courts.
3 The criminal procedure act as now amended permits trials in the absence of the accused
"for any reason."
4 Minister of Interior v. Bechler, [1948 (3)] So. Afr. L.R. 409 (A.D.).
5 Regina v. Ngwevela, [1954 (1)] So. Afr. L.R. 123 (A.D.), followed in Monagotla v. Min.
of Native Affairs, [1959 (1)] So. Afr. L.R. 686 (T), holding however that the authorities cannot
depose an acting tribal chief without giving him an opportunity of a hearing.
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facing his accusers and of cross-examining them, the "supremacy of the
law that Parliament made prevails over the rule of natural justice." The
legislature may make any encroachment it chooses on the life, liberty or
property of any individual subject to its sway, and it is the function of
the courts to enforce its will.' Nevertheless, when a statute is reasonably
capable of more than one meaning, the courts will give it the meaning
which least interferes with the liberty of the individual.7
In short, aside from situations where the legislature did not follow the
machinery prescribed by law-which machinery the legislature is always
free to alter-the authority of the courts to declare legislation, void is
restricted to power to set aside the laws of subordinate legislative bodies
which go beyond their delegated powers.
Some of the powers with which the legislature has armed administrative
bodies and officers, to an American, seem extraordinarily broad and arbitrary. The authorities have power to prohibit public meetings when they
have reason to believe that the public peace will thereby be endangered.
They may prohibit gatherings which might result in feelings of hostility
between whites and others. They may forbid the dissemination of documents calculated to engender such hostility. Under the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (wherein a definition is given to communism which,
inter alia, embraces any doctrine or scheme which aims at encouraging
hostility between the races) the Governor-General may, without giving any
reasons, declare an organization to be unlawful; he may, if satisfied that
they are connected with such an organization, prohibit the printing, publication and dissemination of periodicals; he may prohibit "named" persons
from attending gatherings and order such persons to resign from organizations to which they belong. Under the Public Safety Act, 1953, he may
declare a state of emergency, whereupon he or his delegates have almost
unlimited authority to make regulations to cope with the situation.
Legislation to restrict the movement of Asiatics from one province to
another-even on a visit-has long been in force. In 1950 an act-the
Group Areas Act-which has occasioned voluminous litigation--created
separate areas for the different racial groups and prohibited persons of one
race from acquiring land in an area from persons of another race without
a permit.
Comion Law
So much for the constitutional aspects of the South African legal system.
In contrast, a broad survey of South Africa's common law points up a
feature of its judicial process which is not shared by other legal systems.
6 Sachs v. Min. of Justice, [1954] So. Afr. L.R. 11 (AMD.).
Regina v. Sachs, [1953 (1)] So. Afr. L.R, 392.

7
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The judges draw their law from three independent sources, the laws of
seventeenth century Holland, the jurisprudence of England and America,
and the Roman law. This has resulted in a virile and sound jurisprudence.
A little history will explain how this came about.
Some three decades after the Mayflower sailed for this continent, the
Dutch East India Company sent, from Holland, a small body of Dutchmen
to establish a settlement at the southernmost tip of Africa, the Cape. With
them, of course, they took the legal system prevailing in Holland at the
time. This system, aside from local statutes, was a miscellany of indigenous
Dutch laws and customs, doctored by the writings of Dutch jurists into a
systematic body of law and infused with liberal doses of Roman law
doctrine. This is the basic source of South African law.
When, in 1806, the Cape passed to the British, it had become something more than a mere port of call for scurvy-stricken sailors of the Dutch
East India company to replenish their supplies of green vegetables on their
long voyage to the Far East. A flourishing community, with problems often
quite dissimilar to any faced by their ancestors in Holland, was spreading
northward and eastward. The British-perhaps reluctant to wish on to
unsuspecting newcomers-to-empire such technicalities as their law of future
interests-allowed the existing legal system to remain.
But when confronted with problems in regard to which such legal giants
as Grotius, van Leeuwen and Voet of Holland were silent, what more
natural than that those entrusted with the administration of justice should
turn to Britain for an answer? It was not long before the whole of the
"law merchant"-covering maritime law, insurance, bills of exchange and
the like-had become substantially what it was in England.
For the same reason the adjectival law of the Union shares the general
pattern of that of England. Though there are remedies not known to the
common law, such as the attachment of the property of or the arrest of the
person of a non-resident to found jurisdiction, or the procedure whereby
a litigant can secure a decree of perpetual silence to prevent a possible
future suit when he is no longer in a position to defend it, the system of
pleading and the rules of evidence are, in the main, based on the common
law of England. The nomenclature of the remedies is not of course always
the same.8
Further, the English dichotomy of functions between barristers (advocates who try cases in the superior courts) and solicitors (attorneys who
handle all the other work of a law practice) prevails. Unlike the rule in
England, however, a higher standard of legal training is expected of the
barrister, not of the solicitor. And, as in England, agreements between an
8 A mandatory injunction to restore possession, for example, is called a "spoliation order."
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attorney and his client for a share in the proceeds of any contemplated
litigation are regarded as serious professional misconduct.
The judicial system of South Africa, for obvious reasons, is not identical with that of Great Britain. However, there are basic similarities.
Judges are appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council, and are not
elected. There is no legislative confirmation of or even discussion on such
appointments. They cannot be removed from office except by the GovernorGeneral-in-Council on an address from both houses of the legislature.
There is a division of the supreme court for each province of the Union,
from which all appeals go to a single Appellate Division. Appeals from
there to the English Privy Council have now been abolished. Inferior
courts are presided over by magistrates; there are no justices of the peace
courts.
The native is, in general, subject to the ordinary courts and to the laivs
of the land. However, to accord some recognition to native laws and customs
-where not repugnant to South Africa's laws-and to furnish him with a
less costly forum for his disputes-there are special tribunals for the litigation of causes where only natives are involved. These matters are adjudi:
cated by white officials schooled in the native customs.
A noteworthy exception to the rule that the judicial system is fundamentally British in character is in the matter of jury trials. These have long
been abolished in civil matters. Herein South Africa retains the law of
Holland where juries were unknown. In criminal matters, unless the
defendant elects a jury trial he is normally tried by a judge and one or
two assessors. Both the judge and the assessors resolve questions of fact.
The jury, where jury trial is had, ordinarily consists of nine jurors, a
majority of seven of which determines the verdict. Non-whites cannot and
never could serve. Though a woman has the theoretical right to an allfemale jury, this right has little value since women are not required for
jury service unless they specially apply for enrollment on a special list of
woman jurors.
Probably due to the heterogeneous nature of the country's population
(roughly 2.5 million whites, 8.5 million natives, and about 1.5 million of
mixed blood, with either Asiatic, European, native or Hottentot elements)
jury trials have never been regarded with much favor. Even on an all-white
jury, the danger of racial bias between the English-speaking and the
Afrikaans-speaking cannot be ignored. Prosecuting and defending officers
alike tend to frown on jury trials because, in sparsely populated areas, a
jury will often perforce be made up of the defendant's personal friends or
enemies. So it is that the right to jury trial has been progressively whittled
down by statute. Today, when the charges involve certain offenses, such as
treason, violations of the Atomic Energy Act, or crimes wherein the evi-
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dence is likely to involve technical matters-for example accountancythe Minister of Justice may direct a trial without jury; this discretion now
extends to robbery type crimes and certain violations of the Suppression
of Communism Act.
What of the substantive law of South Africa? To what extent has it
retained its roots in the Roman and Roman Dutch principles of its original
source, and to what extent has it drawn on the common law as we know it?
One finds many words and phrases alien to the legal vocabulary of an
American-"vindicatio," "condictio causa data causa non secuta," "litis
contestatio," and so forth. No attempt can here be made to cover the field.
Sufficient to point up, in each major branch of the substantive law, some
of the principal features of interest to the comparative lawyer.
Crimes
Though, as is to be expected, there are crimes, such as laesae majestatis
(akin to treason and sedition) and injuria (a wrongful and intentional
impairment of another's dignity) which have no exact counterpart in the
Anglo-American system, the basic pattern of South Africa's criminal law is
surprisingly similar. It may perhaps be said that in South Africa the
emphasis on mens rea is greater. It is a very moot question, for example,
whether a mistake of fact, to operate as a defense, need be reasonable as
well as honest. Its unreasonableness is often regarded as merely a factor
going to establish that it was not honestly entertained. Insistence on mens
rea, though, cuts both ways. A defendant may well be convicted in South
Africa as having the requisite guilty intent where at common law he might
escape punishment on a technicality."
Though the courts are aware of a distinction between theft and false
pretenses, many of the refinements of the common law arising from the
rule that without a trespassory taking of possession the crime cannot be
larceny have been avoided.' ° In a way favored by American legislatures,
South African law classifies all crimes of this nature as theft. But false
pretenses, cheating, false personation, and forgery also fall under another
general classification, "falsiteit" (fraud). Some overlapping is inevitable."
9 See, for example, Regina v. Maserow, [1942] So. Afr. L.R. 164 (A.D.), affirming a conviction for receiving stolen property though the goods had been recovered by the police and
redelivered to the thief to trap the defendant, since the latter had the requisite guilty intent.
10 Appropriation by a bailee is theft.
11 See Regina v. Coovadia, [1957 (3)] So. Afr. L.R. 611 (N), holding that where a complainant voluntarily gives up possession of property because of what the defendant has pretended to him, the crime, though properly chargeable as theft, is more closely related to fraud
than to simple theft, and that the indictment, if it is to be supported by evidence of this
nature, must give the defendant particulars reasonably sufficient to enable him to know the
precise case against him.
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If a person is defrauded into handing over goods, the crime is theft. If he is
threatened into so doing, it is robbery.'
A few miscellaneous points of interest. The death penalty can be imposed for treason, rape, robbery or housebreaking, or an attempt to commit
any such crime, if aggravating circumstances are present. Entrapment,
though frowned upon, is not a defense. Crimes cannot ordinarily be prosecuted after a period of twenty years has elapsed. Roman Dutch law recognizes that those who are "defective in understanding and will" cannot be
held responsible for crime.

The Law of Persons
Infants, guardianship, and the relations between spouses are governed
almost exclusively by the Roman Dutch law, though English precedents
not infrequently add their voice in resolving uncertainties.' 3 As to the
status of married women, South Africa, though it has scrapped one gross
anachronism 4 retains another. Unless, before marriage, the spouses have
executed an antenuptial contract and registered it with the Registrar of
Deeds, the marriage is in community of property. This means that everything owned by either spouse, as well as any acquisitions of either spouse
after the marriage, falls, with very few exceptions, into the common estate.
This estate is administered solely by the husband. The wife, therefore, has
an extremely limited contractual capacity. She may bind the community
in respect of contracts for necessaries, and carry on a business with the
consent of her husband, and very little else.
Post-nuptial registration of an antenuptial contract may be authorized
by the courts only in exceptional circumstances, as where the spouses are
able to establish that they had fully intended to marry out of community,
but were through no fault of their own unable to execute and register the
contract.
In addition to excluding the community property, antenuptial contracts
almost invariably provide for the exclusion of the marital power of the
husband (the wife thereby retaining her contractual capacity) and for a
settlement by the husband on the wife. This latter provision is of course
for the protection of the homestead in the event of the husband's
bankruptcy.
12 Min. of Justice v. De Jongh, [1959 (1)] So. Afr. L.R. 234 (A.D.).
13 See, for example, Schroeder v. Schroeder, [1959 (2)] So. Afr. L.R. 6 (N), holding to
be "peculiarly applicable to South African law" the rule that to permit marital relations after
an act of desertion does not constitute condonation, though it does preclude divorce on the
ground of adultery.
14 The right of a husband to administer moderate chastisement is declared to have become
obsolete in South Africa.
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Succession
South African law has direct roots in the Roman Dutch law of Holland,
though a number of modifications bring it more into line with common law.
The universal successor, or "heir" of the Roman law, no longer has the
burden of liquidating and distributing the assets. He is for this purpose
replaced by the executor dative (English administrator on intestacy) or
testamentary (English executor). The executor has no right of retainer in
respect of debts due to him by the decedent.
Corresponding with, though not identical with, the doctrine of hotchpot,
the South African descendant, whether he inherits under will or on intestacy,
must bring into account any gifts he has received or any debt he owes to
the decedent unless the testator has expressed a contrary intent.
The formalities surrounding the execution of wills, now governed by
statute, closely follow the English pattern.
The doctrine of the earlier law, that a testator was bound to leave a
"legitimate portion" to each of his descendants, has been abrogated by
statute. But since the duty of maintaining the decedent's dependents passes
to the heirs of a deceased testator, this works little if any hardship.
As to the order of succession on intestacy, enough to note in passing
the primary rules. 1. The property goes to direct descendants per stirpes
(by representation) ad infinitum. 2. Failing direct descendants, it goes
back to the surviving parents in equal shares. 3. If one parent alone survives, half the estate goes to that parent and the other half is divided among
the brothers and sisters of the decedent (or their descendants, the distribution here too being per stirpes). 4. If both parents are dead, the estate is
divided among the decedent's brothers and sisters or their descendants
per stirpes.
There is a statutory modification of these rules for the protection of a
surviving spouse on intestacy.
Property
South Africa has never been bewildered by the common law's distinctions, in reality, between estates in fee simple, estates at will, estates in tail,
and the like. A person either has ownership or he has not. Principal among
the "rights less than ownership" are servitudes, real as well as personal,
and mortgages. Important among the former is the usufruct (which has
been classified as a personal servitude). This serves much the same purpose as the life tenancy of the common law, and is usually created by will.
The mortgages and pledges known to the common law are, in Roman Dutch
law, classified as "conventional mortgages." Many of the possessory liens
known to the common law, such as the lien of a workman for materials and
labor, fall under the rubric of "legal mortgages" or "tacit hypothecs."
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Many of the difficulties of the common law system, embracing the need
for "constructive trusts" and "resulting trusts," are avoided by the countrywide system of land registration-similar to, though far earlier in origin
than, the Torrens system. The general rule is that rights in land are created
and transferred only by registration against title.
Rights in movables (the terminology is "movables" and "immovables,"
not "realty" and "personalty") are created and transferred by delivery of
possession. In a sale of goods, though the risk of loss passes on completion
of the contract, title does not pass until delivery. Incorporeal rights are
transferred or encumbered by an instrument of cession; but if the right is
an "immovable"--for example, a real servitude-the transaction must be
registered against the title deed.

Equity
The need for separate courts of equity arose in England as a result of
the formalism of the common law -and the existence of situations where
justice demanded a remedy but the law offered none. South African law
does not require such a machine. The courts are there to administer justice,
and in so doing make frequent use of the term "equity" in its broader sense.
The "golden doctrine of unjust enrichment," for example, is freely employed to allow compensation to a bona fide possessor for improvements,
or to remedy the lot of a contractor who has not completely performed his
obligation.
The functions of equity, that is, are performed by the courts as a matter
of course. Thus where there has been a trade name infringement, injunctive
relief (possibly a "rule nisi, operating as a temporary interdict") will lie
without any showing of the non-existence of an "adequate legal remedy." '"
Specific performance of contract is well rooted in the Roman Dutch
law. The main difference between the South African doctrine and the
doctrine as evolved in English equity lies in the emphasis on the court's
discretion. In South Africa the court has a discretion, not to grant the
remedy, but to refuse it in a proper case.
To say that there is no room for English equity jurisprudence in South
i5 Last year, Slenderella of the United States was denied protection of its trade name in

South Africa. The reasoning is interesting. "The action for 'passing off' ...is based on a type of
delict which consists of a representation that the defendant's... business or goods, or both, are
those of the plaintiff .... The court will protect the right of property existing in another in
regard to the name or goodwill. That right of property may be enjoyed by a peregrinus

(foreigper) but only, it would seem, where (he) has a right of property in regard to his name
or goods within the jurisdiction of the court."
This insistence on the requirement that a property right be involved, though clearly borrowed from English equity, is quite consistent with the South African theory 6f tort. Slenderella
Systems, Inc. of America v. Hawkins, (1959 (1)] So. Afr. L.R. 519.
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Africa is not to say that that body of doctrine has not left its mark in the
Union. For example: the cy pres doctrine, employed to determine the fate
of a charitable trust which has failed, has found its way into South African
courts.' But the judges will not adopt doctrines of English equity when
these are alien to Roman Dutch legal theory."
Although the theoretical differences between the trust of English equity
and the Roman fideicommissum are fundamental 8 in South Africa testamentary dispositions phrased in terms of trusts are, thanks to the elasticity
of the concept of fidei commissum, given effect to without violence to
Roman Dutch theory.

Contracts
In the field of contracts, the influence of the common law has been
spectacular. Though special contracts, notably that of sale, have their own
Roman Dutch coloring, any leading South African precedent on the basic
elements of contract will be found to cite the familiar, casebook principles
of the common law. But here again, this "reception" does not go to the
extent of doing violence to established principles of Roman Dutch law.
Thus the courts have rejected the doctrine that consideration is necessary
to support a contract. The civil law requires merely "causa"-some reasonable cause or motive-the exact juristic nature of which is a question which
has agitated the minds of lawyers both in and out of South Africa." The
right of a third party to sue on a contract made for his benefit-a vexed
question in both legal systems-is recognized in the Union.
1

6Ex parte Bosman, [1916] T.P.D. 404. See 52 S.A.L.J. 289. In Marks v. Estate Gluckman,
[1945] So. Afr. L.R. 289 (A.D.) it fell to the court to determine the validity of a testamentary
trust for educational purposes which required the recipient to be a Jew (not converted) and
expressed a desire that the administrator cancel any award "if the grantee prove religiously
inclined." After discussion of the Roman and Roman Dutch law of legacies ad pias causas the
court decided, much in line with Anglo-American doctrine, that the instrument would not fail
for indefiniteness and anti-religious tendencies, the bequest being one for educational purposes
of a public nature. Though the decision was based on Roman Dutch theory, the fact that
"charitable uses" in England embraces trusts for the advancement of education was accorded
due weight.
37 See Standard Bank of S.A. Ltd. v. Betts Brown, [1958 (3)] So. Afr. L.R. 713 (N),
where the court declined counsel's invitation to abandon the "uncharted seas of Roman Dutch
law" as to charitable trusts for the "safe anchorages" of English law, stating that it could see
no reason for abandoning the South African principles relating to bequests ad pias causas nor
any insuperable difficulty in applying them.
18 One major difference is that in trusts the interest of the trustee and that of the cestui
que trust are coexistent; in the fideicommissum they are successive. See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATiVE LAW 408 n. 1 (2d ed. 1959).
19 See LEE, INTRODUCTION To RoMAN DUTCH LAW (5th ed. 1953); Appendix F. Lorenzen,
Causaand Consideration,28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919).
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Tort
The common law, as we know, evolved from a number of independent
actionable wrongs-assault, trespass, and the like. In South Africa on the
other hand the courts, without much regard for classifications put forward
by the Dutch jurists, have drawn on two of the delicts known to the Roman
law to construct a foundation for a broad general theory of liability in
tort. These two delicts are (1) damnum injuria datum and (2) injuria.
The result, in broad terms, is that (1) one who has intentionally or negligently caused patrimonial (pecuniary) loss to another is liable therefor
and (2) one is liable for wilful aggression on another's right. Liability for
negligence, then, rests on a somewhat sweeping general basis, requiring
only proof of loss proximately caused by defendant's negligence. There
has been no need to cultivate distinctions between the duty of care owed
to an invitee, a licensee or a trespasser. As to injuria, which has no recognized counterpart in the common law, this wrong embraces such acts as
assault where insult is the chief feature, defamation, malicious arrest and
malicious prosecution. This makes possible the recognition of a right of
privacy, which the common law was late in protecting.
However, notwithstanding a basic difference in approach, the courts of
South Africa have drawn freely on the common law, taking over, for
example, the whole doctrine of contributory negligence. (Though South
Africa, like England, has now by statute substituted a more equitable doctrine of apportionment of the blame.) Sometimes, for example in applying
the law of defamation and of malicious prosecution, it may be doubted
whether, in this borrowing of doctrine from an alien jurisprudence, violence
has not been done to the essential subjective requirements of liability under
Roman Dutch theory.2"
What of strict liability? The Roman doctrine here was very limited, and
the Dutch authorities show little unanimity Hence South African courts
had little hesitation in adopting the common law rule that a master is liable
for the torts of a servant committed in the course of his employment. And,
with the noteworthy exception of the doctrine of common employment,
which South Africa rejects, in applying this rule they adhere closely to
British precedent.
However, notwithstanding a contrary holding by the former highest
court of appeal, the English Privy Council, the courts consider there is to
be little room in Roman Dutch theory for the doctrine of absolute liability
first announced in Rylands v. Fletcher.
On the question of liability for a mere failure to act, a recent appellate
20

See, for example, [1916] T.P.D. 723; [1925] T.P.D. 857, as to the non-necessity of a
showing of animus injuriandi in a suit for defamation.
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decision is of interest. One of the crew of a fishing vessel was drowned. He
stood in no contractual privity to the defendant, who owned a fleet of
vessels and had leased the one which was wrecked. Defendant had, however, the means of rescue and knew the vessel was in difficulties. The
court, exhaustively reviewing Roman and Roman Dutch authorities,
acknowledged that mere omission to act did not constitute culpa unless
connected with prior conduct and held that whether or not the circumstances gave rise to a legal duty to act is one for the court to decide. In
this case the court, expressing accord with the American Restatement-'
held that a cause of action for damages was stated.2
The Judicial Process
It is in the elasticity of their approach to the sources that the South
African courts are unique. Unlike the judges administering the law under
one of the modern European codes,23 they do not hesitate, if the Roman
Dutch writers have no answer, to examine the spirit and the texts of the
Roman law for an answer.2 4 In a recent decision, for example, involving
the construction of a grant of the right to prospect for diamonds in what
is probably the richest source of that commodity known to the world,
recourse was freely had to the Roman doctrines as to the seashore as
publici juris.s Further, they do not apply stare decisis with the rigidity
with which it is applied in England. "It is stating the doctrine somewhat
too widely," said a South African court as long ago as 1904, "to say that it
is illegal or impossible for a court to reverse its own findings on a question
of law ...the statement that any court is bound by its own decisions can
never mean more than that it is a rule of practice of such court to follow
its previous decisions." 6 On occasion, thanks perhaps to a closer working
relationship with Roman maxims than have the judges of England, South
21 RESTATEMENT,

TRTSTS § 321, stating the rule that where A lends a car to B, and later

is told by his chauffeur that the steering gear is defective, and A could have, but did not, inform
B of this defect, A is liable to a third party involved in an accident when riding with B in
the car.
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Silva's Fishing Corp. v. Mawege, [1957 (2)] So. Afr. L.R. 263 (A.D.).
23 See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 174 (2d ed. 1959), ("The Codes' Break with the
Past.")
24 See, to cite a random example, Morrison v. Standard Building Society, [19321 So. Afr.
L.R. 229 (A.D.), where the court considered the Roman law to assist it in determining whether
an unincorporated building society can sue in its own name.
25 Consolidated Diamond Mines v. Administrator, SWA, [1958 (4)] So. Afr. L.R. 572
(A.D.), where one of the many issues was the extent to which the rights of the public preclude
the sovereign from granting to others rights which do not interfere with the ordinary user by
the public
of the beaches.
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African courts are able to resolve contradictions or inconsistencies in the
English decisions which have baffled the English themselves.27
South African law is "universal in the sense that there is virtually no
limitation to the reservoir of legal knowledge from which its principles may
be drawn. It is reasonable both in its broad equitable spirit, which refuses
to be cramped by a soulless and rigid legality, and thereby forced into
situations at which common sense rebels, and also in its practical treatment
of authorities, drawing from them the germ and rejecting the chaff ."'

Conclusiolt
In the reports of recent appearance are rules of law, as old as the Roman
Colosseum, which form part of the modern South African law of sale; a
decision following American law as to the liability of a master where his
servant temporarily abandons his service and then resumes it to cause
damage to another; another where, on Roman law principles, it accepts the
rule of the Restatement as to the position when a promissor himself brings
about a condition subsequent that is, in terms of the contract, to terminate
it; another where the Anglo-American law as to c.i.f. contracts is followed;
another where the court cites Voet as well as Wigmore in ruling as to the
conclusiveness of a judicial admission; yet another discussing the validity
of a polygamous marriage; and finally, there are cases which raise questions as remote from the United States as from Roman law, such as the
effect of disobedience by a tribal native of a lawful order of his chief who
was not appointed by the Governor-General; the regard to be had, in
punishing one convicted of the crime of imputing witchcraft to another,
to the fact that the imputation has driven that other to suicide; and the
criminality of an utterance, "with intent to promote feelings of hostility
between Africans and Europeans" to the effect that the African people are
like an elephant being beaten or driven by a small man, not realizing they
had the power to overcome him.
South Africa looks backwards, to Rome, to seventeenth century Holland; it looks sideways, to England and America; it does not regard itself
as irrevocably committed to either. In adopting this approach to a solution
of the problems of today it presents a fruitful and fascinating field for the
comparative lawyer.
27 See, for example, Jajbhay v. Cassim, [1939] So. Afr. L.R. 537 (A.D.), where the
court, discussing the English precedents involving the rule that no cause of action can be
based on an illegal transaction, suggests that the contradictory results are due to a failure to
distinguish two separate principles, namely, ex turpi causa non oritur actio (which admits of
no exceptions) and, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendantis/possidentis (which does
admit of exceptions).
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